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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They
recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory
in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due
course on the extent of these accessions, and that the final delimitations
of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace
Before leaving for the Crimea, Churchill and Roosevelt held high hopes
of arresting the march of Russian imperialism. Their statements, given
under pressure of public opinion, left no doubts on this point. They had
not recognised the transformation of the € Lublin Committee 3 Into the
c Provisional Government' and still supportedc their ' Polish Government
in London. American Congress argued that America was not fighting
to substitute one totalitarianism in Europe for another. Roosevelt,
challenged by Churchill's speech of December 15, in turn expressed
his view on the state of affairs in Europe in his New Year message to
Congress. His high-sounding slogans were in complete opposition
to Stalin's already accomplished moves and self-motivated actions.
Roosevelt wrote :—
" I should not be frank if I did not admit anxieties about many situa-
tions—the Greek and Polish, for example. But those situations are not as
easy or as simple to deal with as some spokesmen., whose sincerity I do not
question, would have us believe. We have obligations, not necessarily
legal, to the exiled Governments, to the underground leaders and to our
major Allies who came much nearer the shadows than we did.
" We and our Allies have declared that it is our purpose to respect the
right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will
live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who
have been forcibly deprived of them. But with internal dissension, with
many citizens of liberated countries still prisoners-of-war or forced to labour
in Germany, it is difficult to guess the kind of self-government the people
really want.
" During the interim period, until conditions permit a genuine expression
of the people s will, we and our Allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore
to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities
in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the people's right
freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men
they are to live.'
Furthermore in his message, Roosevelt added:—
" It is a good and a useful thing—it is an essential thing—to have prin-
ciples toward which we campaign. And we shall not hesitate to use our
influence—and to use it now—to secure so far as is humanly possible the
fulfilment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, we have not shrunk
from the military responsibilities brought on by this war. We cannot, and
will not, shrink from the political responsibilities which follow in the wake
of battle."
Two weeks after penning these noble phrases Roosevelt together with
Churchill placed his name to a document absolutely contrary to every
principle they had proclaimed heretofore. The arguments which